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CEO Compensation and Firm Performance— 
Are They Related? 
Barb Kube 
What do IBM, Sunbeam/Oster, Westinghouse Electric, Time 
Warner, General Motors and American Express all have in common? 
In the past year all of these companies have acquired new chief 
executive officers (CEOs) (Saporito, p. 10). These changes are 
just a small example of the growing power of disgruntled 
shareholders. Upset at increasing wealth of CEOs in the face of 
poor or stagnant corporate performance, shareholders are speaking 
out, and they aren't the only ones. This controversy has also 
prompted the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to enact 
stricter guidelines for proxies. Additionally, movements to 
enact compensation-limiting legislation have been initiated by 
several members of Congress. Alternatively, it can be argued 
that well-structured compensation packages, by increasing CEO 
incentives, actually benefit shareholders. 
This paper attempts to assess the ability of compensation 
packages to affect firm performance. Following a review of 
principal-agent theory and previous research, a section is 
devoted to the explanation of the model that is utilized in this 
paper. Both theoretical and empirical models are outlined. The 
next portion reports the results of the statistical testing of 
the model. Finally, this paper addresses the "real-world" 
implications of its findings. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
At the heart of the debate surrounding CEO compensation is a 
classic principal-agent problem. Economists theorize that a 
principal-agent problem arises whenever there are incentives for 
the agent to pursue interests that differ from those of the 
principal. In this case the CEO (agent) may be tempted to 
maximize his/her personal utility, as opposed to maximizing 
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shareholder (principal) wealth. Adam Smith expressed such an 
opinion of non-owning corporate executives in The Wealth of 
Nations: 
Being the managers rather of other people's money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance.... Negligence and profusion must always 
prevail.(Wechsler, p. 211) 
Thus, it would seem that the principal-agent problem arises as 
CEOs become less dependent upon corporate performance for their 
income. Acting as key decision-makers, but without having a 
personal stake in the performance of the company, CEOs can 
benefit and prosper even when the corporation performs poorly. 
Enter the era of pay-for-performance compensation programs. 
Leonard asserts that,"by 1985 long-term incentive plans had been 
nearly universally adopted by large corporations" (Leonard, p. 13-
S). This course of action is aimed at reconciling the interests 
of the CEO with those of the shareholders by tying executive pay 
to some measure of firm performance. As compensation becomes 
more performance-based, both the expected cost of the 
compensation package and the expected performance of the firm 
increase. Therefore, the theoretical solution to the principal-
agent problem lies in establishing an equilibrium between the 
value of an incremental change in corporate performance and the 
value of an incremental change in CEO compensation (Abowd, 
p. 53-S). While it may sound simple, measuring compensation can 
be tricky. 
First, firm performance can be measured by either 
accounting, economic or market measures. Return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE) are both accounting measures; after-
tax gross economic return (ERET)is an economic measure of 
profitability; and total shareholder return (TSR) is a market 
measure of firm performance. All of these examples are expressed 
as percentages. Even though ERET is the best measure of 
profitability, it is often difficult to find the necessary data 
with which to calculate this measure of performance. 
Aside from performance measures, there are many components 
of compensation packages that must be considered: salary, bonus 
payments, stock options, payments from long-term compensation 
plans, restricted stock awards, thrift-plan contributions, 
company-paid health and insurance plans, auto allowances and 
other executive "perks." It is not always easy to determine how 
much and in what form a CEO is being compensated. Thus, 
examining the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance can be quite involved. 
In the real world there appear to be numerous examples in 
which poor corporate performance is accompanied by increasing CEO 
compensation. In light of such evidence, one might wonder how 
well these compensation programs are achieving their objective. 
Recent research conducted by Michael C. Jensen of Harvard 
University and Kevin J. Murphy of the University of Rochester 
analyzes the sensitivity of total CEO compensation to firm 
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performance for the years of 1974-1986 (Jensen, pp. 226-227). 
They used regression analysis to compute the sensitivities for 
the individual components of compensation packages, including 
base salary, bonus and stock options. Additionally, they 
compared the various sensitivities for large versus small 
companies (Jensen, p. 260J1. 
Of particular interest is the regression equation that tests 
the overall sensitivity of CEO wealth [TC=TP+pv(S+B)] to 
changes in shareholder in shareholder wealth (reproduced 
from Jensen, p. 229): 
TABLE 1. Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivity: coefficients 
of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of CHANGE(SALARY+BONUS), 
CHANGE(TOTAL PAY), and CHANGE(PAY-RELATED WEALTH) on CURRENT and 
LAGGED CHANGE(SHAREHOLDER WEALTH)—in thousands of 1986 constant 
dollars. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Intercept 
Change SHW 
Change SHW, 
year (t-1) 
R2 
Estimated 
pay-
performance 
sensitivity 
b 
F-statistic 
for b 
Sample size 
change 
(SALARY 
+BONUS) 
31.7 
.000014 
(8.0) 
.0082 
.000014 
64.0* 
7,750 
change 
(SALARY 
+B0NUS) 
30.8 
.000014 
(8.4) 
.000008 
(5.5) 
.0123 
.000022 
93.0* 
7,688 
change 
(TOTAL PAY) 
36.6 
.000024 
(5.2) 
.000009 
(2.4) 
.0041 
.000033 
28.5* 
7,688 
TOTAL PAY+ 
[change 
(SALARY+BONUS)] 
918.0 
.000197 
(9.7) 
.000103 
(5.8) 
.0157 
.000300 
117.7* 
7,688 
Note-The sample Is constructed from longitudinal data reported In Forbes on 1, 688 CEOs serving In 
1,049 firms for the years 1974-86. Change(SHW) Is defined as the beglnnlng-of-perlod market value 
multiplied by the Inflation-adjusted rate of return on common stock, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
'Significant at the 0.01 percent level. 
The Forbes definition of total compensation typically includes salary, bonus, value of restricted 
stock, savings and thrift plans, and other benefits but does not include the value of stock options granted 
or the gains from exercising stock options. 
Present value based on the assumption that the CEO receives salary and bonus increment until age 70 at 
a discount rate of 3 percent. 
Estimated b is the sum of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged shareholder wealth change. 
Results of Jensen and Murphy's study revealed that bonuses 
were the least sensitive to changes in firm performance (Jensen, 
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p. 262). Overall they estimated that: 
...[T]he total pay-performance sensitivity—including 
both pay and dismissal—is about 75 cents per $1,000 
change in shareholder wealth for the full sample 
(45 cents and $3.15 per $1,000 for large and small 
firms, respectively).(Jensen, p. 261) 
Based on these results, they concluded that annual changes in 
executive compensation are not significantly responsive to 
changes in corporate performance. 
Suppose that studies like that of Jensen and Murphy 
establish that pay is based on performance. This result would 
not, by itself, guarantee that higher pay is an effective 
incentive. To decide that question, we need to know not the 
effect of performance on pay, but the effect of pay on 
performance. 
Bhile the Jensen^Murphy study did not address the issue of 
whether or not firms are able to^design compenFation: packages 
that positively influence future performance, Cornell 
.University's John Abowd did just that. Dr. Abowd used data from 
1981-1986 and tested to see if corporate performance depends on 
executive compensation programs. More specifically, he wanted to 
know if the composition of compensation packages elicits specific 
behavior from the agents. Using OLS regression analysis, he was 
able to estimate the ability of compensation plans to affect 
corporate performance during the next time period (Abowd, p. 52-
S). Abowd tested four different measures of corporate 
performance: after-tax return on equity (ROE), after-tax return 
on assets (ROA), after-tax gross economic return (ERET) and total 
share-holder return (TSR)2. 
Abowd's most compelling work involved the performance 
equation of his continuous model, which was designed to,"focu[s] 
on the conditional expectation of future corporate performance 
given an elaborate, nonlinear function of current performance and 
compensation (Abowd, p. 52-S)". For a dependent variable, he 
used the conditional expectation of the four performance 
variables: ROE, ROA, ERET or TSR. Independent variables 
included the current performance measure (calculated in the same 
manner in which the dependent variable was figured), current 
adjusted J.og of jtqtal salary, total assets at the beginning of 
the year and two interaction terms^ that combimed^expected^ future 
performance with current compensation (1) when current 
performance was below average and (2) when current performance 
was above average. The model was further tested by substituting 
the bonus as a percentage of base salary for total salary in the 
interaction terms and substituting base salary for total salary 
in the log variable (Abowd, pp. 52-S, 62-S, 66-S, 67-S). (See 
Table 2) 
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TABLE 2. Performance Equation for Abowd's Continuous Model 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables3 
PERF(t+l) PERF(t) 
In TOTAL SALARY(t) 
TOTAL ASSETS 
PERF(t) * COMP(t); 
PERF(t)>median 
PERF(t) * COMP(t); 
PERF(t)<median 
ROE and ROA, accounting measures of profitability, were not as 
sensitive to CEO compensation as were ERET, an economic measure 
of performance and TSR, a market measure of corporate 
performance. However, Abowd conceded that a bias against the 
accounting measures of performance may have been present because 
he excluded multi-year plans of compensation from his study; 
multi-year plans are generally based on ROE and ROA. Even so, he 
concluded that basing compensation on, or increasing 
compensation-sensitivity to ERET or TSR "...may be associated 
with better performance on that measure in the future" (Abowd, p. 
68-S). 
II. MODEL 
Combining the empirical techniques used by Abowd, the 
measurement methodology of Jensen and Murphy and principal-agent 
theory will hopefully provide additional insight into the 
controversies surrounding CEO compensation. Particular attention 
is paid to the ability of firms to influence future performance 
through their CEO compensation packages. To begin, the list of 
factors that influence firm performance for any given year is 
seemingly endless. Some of the dominant variables include: the 
state of the economy, the financial position of the firm at the 
beginning of the studied year, management and firm performance in 
the preceding time period. Thus, performance can be expressed as 
the following: 
PERF(t) - f(SOE, Assets, CEO comp, PERF(t-l)) 
Various measures of performance exist. Using performance 
measures such as ROE, ROA, ERET and TSR, which are expressed as 
percentages can help avoid biasing results against small firms 
just because they deal in smaller monetary transactions. A 
complete analysis would evaluate accounting, economic and market-
based measures. 
Measuring assets helps to account for size differentials 
between firms—those with more assets are likely to have higher 
total compensation packages for CEOs, and the CEOs are less 
likely to own a significant percentage of the outstanding stock 
(the firm will probably have a larger number of stock shares 
outstanding). The most appropriate measure of a firm's assets is 
the value of total assets at the beginning of the time period in 
question (this is equivalent to the total value of a firm's 
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assets at the end of the previous time period). 
As Leonard pointed out, most firms claim to link CEO 
compensation to firm performance (Leonard, p. 13-S). 
Accordingly, compensation should serve as an incentive to improve 
performance. Including the various components of compensation 
packages as influences on performance may help identify ways in 
which to close existing gaps between the often competing goals 
facing the CEO, those of personal wealth maximization and the 
goals of the firm (shareholders), profit maximization. Annual 
base salary, bonuses, stock options and other "long-term" perks 
such as health insurance, auto allowances and thrift plan 
contributions are used in varying degrees to reward CEOs for 
their role in affecting performance. Compensation for one year 
serves as incentive for the following year: if performance 
increases and the CEO is rewarded with a larger compensation 
package, then future performance is more likely to improve; and 
if poor performance is accompanied by a similar change in the 
compensation package, then future performance is likely to 
improve as the CEO takes quick, profit-maximizing action in hopes 
of increasing the value of his/her compensation package. 
Table 3 shows the explanatory variables and the effects that 
they would be expected to have on performance. 
TABLE 3. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
State of the Economy: (+) The SOE is positively related to firm 
performance. In general, as the economy improves so does 
performance, and when the economy is experiencing a downturn so 
too do most companies. Also, how a firm's performance is 
impacted by the economy is determined by the type of products or 
services in which the firm deals—normal vs. inferior. 
Assets: (+ or -) Assets can be an indicator of firm size, 
depending on whether economies of scale or diseconomies of scale 
are present. As company size increases it is more difficult to 
monitor the actions of and the decisions facing the CEO; it is 
easier for the CEO to undertake activities that will maximize 
his/her own utility instead of maximizing firm performance. 
Because of this, it is more difficult and more costly to 
establish a compensation package that successfully coordinates 
the interests of the CEO with those of the firm. Stock holder 
apathy, which also tends to increase as the size of the firm 
increases, can also contribute to lower performance—stock 
holders are less likely to be aware of CEO compensation and less 
likely to get involved in decision making. If larger firms are 
expected to be less efficient than their smaller counterparts, 
the coefficient for assets is expected to be negative 
(diseconomies of scale); if larger firms are more efficient than 
their smaller counterparts, the coefficient for assets is 
expected to be positive (economies of scale). 
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Annual base salary and bonus for CEO (S+B): (+*) Base salary 
does vary from year to year, and theoretically it should move in 
the direction of firm performance. This tends to be the most 
stable portion of a compensation package. Given out annually as 
well as other times throughout the fiscal year when performance 
figures are announced, bonuses are perhaps the most performance-
sensitive element of compensation packages. Accordingly, 
performance should be sensitive to (S+B)—anticipation of a 
larger portion of compensation being in the form of bonuses 
should positively influence performance. 
Stock options awarded to CEO: (+) Stock options are positively 
related to market-based performance measures because, 
theoretically, a CEO will increase his/her wealth only if the 
firm performs well in the marketplace. Since stock options can 
be held for up to ten years before exercising them, it is 
possible for a CEO to hold on to them during years of poor 
performance and exercise them in the more prosperous future 
(Byrne, p. 34). This makes it hard to predict whether or not the 
relationship will be statistically significant. 
Furthermore, it is possible for CEOs to benefit from options 
even when real performance is not improving. This occurs during 
periods of inflation or bull markets. A CEO may realize a 
significant profit from exercising options while real firm 
performance has either not changed or has worsened. Thus, the 
suggested incentive provided by stock options appears to be 
overstated. 
Other components of CEO compensation: (-) Additional elements of 
compensation are often referred to as executive "perks". These 
are very rarely tied to firm performance. Therefore, they do not 
provide an incentive to maximize profit. In fact, some CEOs may 
prefer to maximize perks and thereby decrease profits. 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS: 
Since this study is primarily concerned with the ability of 
compensation packages to influence firm performance, it will 
focus on the following relationship: 
PERF(t) = (size, CEO COMPENSATION(t-1)) 
Cross-sectional data found in the Executive Compensation Surveys 
for Corporate America's Most Powerful People as well as those for 
The 200 Best Small Companies, published by Forbes, provides a 
sample of compensation and corporate performance information for 
nearly 1000 CEOs. Using cross-sectional data serves as a control 
for the state of the economy (SOE), since all firms will be 
observed at the same point in the business cycle. Therefore, SOE 
will not be included. This study utilizes compensation and 
performance figures for the years of 1989-1991. Forty CEOs were 
randomly selected from each survey group with the stipulation 
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that the same individual serve as CEO for both 1990 and 1991. 
Other performance and asset values were obtained from Standard & 
Poor's Stock Reports as well as The Market Guide4. 
Unfortunately, a potential for bias exists because the 
Forbes surveys only include the "best" firms; there is a chance 
that important relationships may go undetected simply because 
certain companies did not make the "A" list. The voluntary nature 
of the surveys results in some data not being reported for all 
firms. Additionally, large financial institutions were omitted 
from this study due to a lack of comparable performance 
information. Such inaccessibility to data may hinder the 
accuracy of the results. 
Prior to the 1992 passage of a SEC regulation, firms had not 
been required to report the amount of stock options that were 
awarded to their CEOs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
Forbes data is neither complete nor consistent—the data for 
stock options is sometimes listed as a dollar value, at other 
times only the number of options is recorded and in some cases 
the data is omitted all together. Given the importance of such 
options in CEO compensation packages, excluding them from this 
study will diminish the explanatory power of the equations 
(Peale, p. 1). Furthermore, the Forbes data reports annual 
salary and bonuses as one figure. This makes it more difficult 
to determine which elements of compensation are most effective in 
influencing firm performance. 
Table 4 presents a summary of all the variables used during 
statistical analysis: 
TABLE 4. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Performance measures (current—1991 and lagged—1990); 
Return on Assets (ROA): An accounting measure of performance, 
ROA is sometimes calculated as (Net Income + Interest)/(Average 
total assets for the fiscal year). 
Return on Equity (ROE): An accounting measure of performance 
that can be calculated as (Net Income - Income to Minority 
Interests - Preferred Stock Dividends Paid)/(Average Common Stock 
Equity over the fiscal year). 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR): This is a market measure of 
performance and is calculated as (Dividends per share + Capital 
Gain per share)/(Price per share of common stock at the end of 
the previous calendar year) (Abowd, pp. 59-S, 60-S). 
Change in the performance variables was also tested. 
Compensation Variables (current—1991 and lagged—1990); 
(Salary + Bonus): (S+B) includes all cash, deferred salary, 
bonus payments plus any directors fees and commission; this 
variable is measured in millions of dollars. 
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Other: Payments from long-term compensation plans, restricted 
stock awards (vested or released from restriction), thrift plan 
contributions, company-paid health and insurance plans plus any 
other benefits such as auto allowances—does not include stock 
options. This is measured in millions of dollars. 
Total Pay: (S+B) + (Other); measured in millions of dollars. 
Present Value of Total Pay: Total Pay * (l+i)AT; T=70-present 
age and i=.03. This assumes that the CEO receives an increment 
of (S+B) until age 70, at a discount rate of .03. This is 
measured in millions of dollars. 
Pay-related Wealth: PRW = Total Pay + pv(Total Pay), and is 
measured in millions of dollars. 
Both percentage change and change in total compensation were also 
analyzed. 
Other: 
Assets (current and lagged): This is the total value of a firm's 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; measured in millions 
of dollars. 
Size: A dummy variable for firm size; 1 if large, 0 if small. 
This variable, like Assets, is included as a possible way of 
controlling for economies of scale. 
Dividends (lagged): Dividends (Div) given out per share of 
common stock; measured in dollars per share. 
Stock Price (lagged): Stock price (SP) per share of common 
stock; measured in dollars per share. 
Capital gains (lagged): Capital gains (CG) reported; measured 
in dollars per share. 
Interaction terms: Interaction variables were created between 
the dummy variable for size and the various measures of 
compensation. 
Statistical results are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7. 
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TABLE 5. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics 
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** = 
.01. 
Dependent Variable—ROE(t) (%) 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
PRW(t-l) 
(S+B)(t-1) 
(OTHER)(t-1) 
Intercept 
adj. R2 
F-stat 
Sample size 
(1) 
OLS 
-.1283 
(5.654***) 
.0039 
(2.121 **) 
• • • • 
• • • • 
.2404 
.2762 
16.074 
80 
(1) 
WLS 
-.1408 
(6.639***) 
.0043 
(8.327***) 
• • • • 
• • • s 
.2397 
.9012 
244.4853 
80 
(2) 
OLS 
-.1247 
(5.650***) 
• • • • 
.0113 
(2.083 **) 
• C O * 
.2402 
.2748 
15.9664 
80 
(3) 
OLS 
-.1237 
(5.603***) 
• • • • 
.0112 
(2.064 **) 
-.0016 
(0.093 ) 
.2402 
.2653 
10.5102 
80 
At first glance the low R2 values of these regressions may 
seem to indicate the failure of this model. However, the primary 
relationship to be examined is not accounted for by R2. Rather 
than trying to account for all of the determinants of 
performance, these regressions focus on the effects that firm 
size and CEO compensation elements have on performance. For all 
three performance measures firm size is negatively related to 
performance. This can be seen in the negative coefficients for 
the dummy variable for SIZE as well as the variable ASSETS (with 
the exception of its insignificantly positive correlation to 
TSR). This indicates the presence of diseconomies of scale, and 
there are two possible explanations for this. First, the recent 
recession has resulted in large-scale corporate down-sizing. 
Second, large firms face higher employee-monitoring costs; it 
costs more to develop a successful, performance-sensitive CEO 
compensation package. 
Perhaps most importantly, in all instances compensation 
variables have the expected signs. Overall, size and 
compensation elements are most successful in affecting ROE. 
Their impact on TSR is somewhat lower. These results are just 
the opposite of what Abowd found, but that is probably due to the 
differences in calculating compensation. Additionally, in light 
of the results for autocorrelation correction, the ability of 
size and compensation to affect ROA remains questionable. 
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TABLE 6. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics 
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** = 
.01. 
Dependent Variable—TSR(t) 
(return per dollar) 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
PRW(t-l) 
ch(PRW) 
ASSETS(t) 
DlV(t-l) 
SP(t-l) 
CG(t-l) 
Intercept 
adj. R2 
F-stat 
Sample size 
(4) 
OLS 
-.3040 
(1.635 *) 
.0530 
(2.096 **) 
.0525 
(1.831 *) 
.0000 
( .114 ) 
.0438 
(.389 ) 
-.0086 
(3.047***) 
-.0106 
(2.116 **) 
.6016 
.2019 
3.7827 
78 
-
The fact that TSR did not fare as well as ROE as a dependent 
variable does not mean that CEO compensation does not affect 
shareholder return. It is very likely that the missing stock 
options data would fill in this missing link, giving a better 
picture of the true relationship between CEO compensation and 
TSR. With that data now becoming available, so too is the 
opportunity for future research. Such research could enhance the 
explanatory power of this study. 
Although the results for the regression using ROA as a 
dependent variable cannot be viewed as reliable, it is 
encouraging that the variables had the theoretically correct 
signs. On the other hand, it is surprising that the coefficient 
for ASSETS is not significant in either the OLS or the Hildreth-
Lu corrected model5. 
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TABLE 7. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics 
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** = 
.01. 
Dependent Variable—ROA(t) (%) 
(5) 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
(S+B)(t-1) 
ASSETS(t) 
Intercept 
adj. R2 
F-stat 
Sample size 
OLS 
-.0925 
(5.323***) 
.0070 
(1.937 **) 
-.0000 
(1.305 ) 
.1418 
.3605 
13.2119 
66 
Hildreth-Lu for 
Autocorrelation 
-.0410 
(1.786 *) 
.0076 
(1.664 *) 
-.0000 
(0.992 ) 
.0886 
-.1158 
0.0000 
66 
Additional regressions were run using the interaction terms 
between firm size and the various compensation elements in order 
to test the hypothesis that performance was jointly affected by 
size and compensation. The results did not confirm such a 
relationship. When regressed against ROE, coefficients for the 
interaction terms were negative, which would substantiate the 
belief that larger firms are not as successful as small firms at 
making CEO compensation sensitive to performance. However, t-
statistics were around .337 with prob values of .737. Thus, the 
results cannot be viewed as reliable. ROA and TSR regressions 
had similarly insignificant results. 
By far, the most encouraging results were achieved with the 
equations that used ROE as the performance-measuring, dependent 
variable. When interpreting the results, it can be seen that in 
the WLS version of equation (1) a $1 million increase in PRW(t-l) 
brings about an estimated .43% increase in ROE, other things 
being equal. Similarly, holding all else constant, a small firm 
is expected to have an estimated ROE of 23.97% while its larger 
counterpart has an expected ROE of 9.89%. Furthermore, equation 
(3) reveals that performance, as measured by ROE, is positively 
related to the (S+B) portion of compensation—a $1 million 
increase in (S+B), ceteris paribus, brings about a 1.12% increase 
in ROE. These results support the theoretical predictions that 
were presented earlier. One disappointment, however, is that the 
coefficient for the (Other) element of compensation was not 
significant. 
So, what do these results reveal about the possibility of 
influencing firm performance through CEO compensation? All in 
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all, the results are encouraging. Not only do the results 
indicate that performance is significantly affected by CEO 
compensation, but they also reveal that performance is influenced 
by more than just the level of compensation. In fact, these 
results hint at specific ways in which stockholders and boards of 
directors can shape compensation packages in order to bring about 
better performance on specific performance measures. For 
example, it appears that one way in which to increase ROE is to 
decrease the amount of compensation that is accounted for by 
(Other) components and increase the performance-based (S+B) 
portion of compensation. Thus, it is possible to better 
coordinate the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders. 
/ Perhaps compensation committees and stockholders alike would 
do well to heed Dr. Murphy's advice, "The level of CEO pay is not 
an important shareholder [performance-related] issue. The 
structure of CEO pay is much more important....The cost of paying 
the CEO too much is trivial compared to the cost of paying the 
CEO in a way that provides inadequate incentives" (Yates, p. 2). 
It is only by recognizing and understanding these important 
relationships between CEO compensation and firm performance that 
society can take meaningful actions toward resolving this 
divisive issue. Hopefully the results of studies such as this 
will help to resolve the compensation controversy. 
********** 
ENDNOTES 
1. Jensen and Murphy acquired their data from the Forbes 
Executive Compensation Surveys from 1974 to 1986, Standard and 
Poor's Compustat data service and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) (Jensen, p. 228). Instead of using 
separate sources for large and small firm data, they merely 
considered firms with a market value above the median in the 
Forbes surveys to be large, and those below the median to be 
small (Jensen, p. 237). 
2. Abowd utilized information provided by Standard & Poor's 
COMPUSTAT, as well as the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of 
Economic Analysis time series (Abowd, p. 68-S—69-S). 
3. Abowd's definition of Total Salary only included annual base 
salary plus annual bonuses; he did not account for any long-term 
components or "perks". Total assets for year t were computed as 
total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. Additionally, the 
interaction terms were figured in the following manner: one term 
had a value equal to Perf(t)*Comp(t-l) if performance was above 
the median performance of firms listed with the NYSE, otherwise; 
and the other had a value equal to Perf(t)*Comp(t-l) if 
performance was below the median performance of firms listed with 
the NYSE, 0 otherwise. Both interaction terms were expected to 
be positively correlated with performance(t), assuming that 
compensation packages were indeed performance-sensitive (Abowd 
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p.58-S). 
4. Data was acquired from the following sources: 
ROE: large, Moody's Handbook of Common Stock 
small, Forbes survey of The 200 Best Small 
Companies 
Stock Prices: large, Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys for 
America's Most Powerful People 
small, Forbes 
Dividends: large, Forbes 
small, Moody's and The Market Guide (data from 
these two sources is comparable) 
ROA: large, Standard & Poor's Stock Reports 
small, Standard & Poor's and The Market Guide (data 
from these two sources is comparable) 
Total Assets: large, Standard & Poor's 
small, Standard & Poor's and The Market Guide 
Compensation: large, Forbes 
small, Forbes 
5. Unfortunately all of my attempts at manually correcting for 
autocorrelation ended in frustration as Y-stat locked up on me. 
While I expected the significance of my regression to diminish 
after the correction, I was very surprised at the drastic change 
in both R2 and the t-statistics as a result of the Hildreth-Lu 
correction for autocorrelation. The other automatic correction 
produced similar results. Since the variables were fairly 
significant before correction, I decided to include them in my 
results. 
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